The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Auctionin Entry into Tournaments
Abstract
A research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented. For a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two. This insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants. While customary uniform‐price and discriminatory‐price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem, in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants. Instead, we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete, regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity.
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Cites
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1986) · Scholarship@Western (Western University) · Cited by 2,240
Self-citationPrizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments
Rosen, S. (1985) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w1668 · Cited by 1,088
Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.7916/d87h1v6s · Cited by 975
Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages
Weiss, A. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.4.133 · Cited by 770
Guesnerie, R., & Laffont, J.-J. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90060-4 · Cited by 648
Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_18 · Cited by 491
Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes
O'Keeffe, M., Viscusi, W. K., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (1984) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298022 · Cited by 391
Digging for golden carrots: an analysis of research tournaments
Taylor, C. R. (1995) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 361
Cited by
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Marginality and Problem-Solving Effectiveness in Broadcast Search
Jeppesen, L. B., & Lakhani, K. R. (2010) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1090.0491 · Cited by 1,178
Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving
Terwiesch, C., & Xu, Y. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0884 · Cited by 923
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.3.542 · Cited by 860
Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis
Boudreau, K. J., Lacetera, N., & Lakhani, K. R. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1322 · Cited by 830
Metadata
- Authors
- Fullerton, R. L., & McAfee, R. P.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 573-605
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1965092854
- Cited by
- 456
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 11.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.