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The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
Open accessAbstract
All prescriptions of behavior for individuals require enforcement.Usually the obligation to behave in a prescribed way is entered into voluntarily by explicit or implicit contract.For example, I promise to teach certain classes with designated frequency and to discuss matters which I, and possibly others, believe are relevant to the course titles.By negotiation, and in the event of its failure, by legal action, I and my employer seek to enforce the contract of employment against large departures from the promised behavior.Performance of some kinds of behavior is difficult or impossible to enforce-such as promises to be creative, noble, or steadfast in crisis-and as a result such contractual promises .are either not made or enforced only when there is an uncontroversially flagrant violation.The influence upon contract, and upon economic
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Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Cited by
Bayesian model selection in social research
Raftery, A. E. (1995) · Sociological Methodology · doi:10.2307/271063 · Cited by 6,823
Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior
Becker, G. S. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261880 · Cited by 1,609
Bayesian Model Averaging for Linear Regression Models
Raftery, A. E., Madigan, D., & Hoeting, J. A. (1997) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1997.10473615 · Cited by 1,287
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.1.45 · Cited by 1,159
Chayes, A., & Chayes, A. H. (1993) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027910 · Cited by 1,002
Metadata
- Authors
- Stigler, G. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1970-05
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 526-536
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2038663319
- Cited by
- 1,147
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 17.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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