The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Marriage: Part I
Abstract
I present in this paper the skeleton of a theory of marriage. The two basic assumptions are that each person tries to do as well as possible and that the "marriage market" is in equilibrium. With the aid of several additional simplifying assumptions, I derive a number of significant implications about behavior in this market. For example, the gain to a man and woman from marrying compared to remaining single is shown to depend positively on their incomes, human capital, and relative difference in wage rates. The theory also implies that men differing in physical capital, education or intelligence (aside from their effects on wage rates), height, race, or many other traits will tend to marry women with like values of these traits, whereas the correlation between mates for wage rates or for traits of men and women that are close substitutes in household production will tend to be negative. The theory does not take the division of output between mates as given, but rather derives it from the nature of the marriage market equilibrium. The division is determined here, as in other markets, by marginal productivities, and these are affected by the human and physical capital of different persons, sex ratios (that is, the relative numbers of men and women), and some other variables.
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Citations
Cites
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
Koopmans, T. C., & Beckmann, M. (1957) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907742 · Cited by 2,308
Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply
Heckman, J. (1974) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913937 · Cited by 1,852
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Bulmer, M. G., Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., & Bodmer, W. F. (1972) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2344702 · Cited by 1,658
World Revolution and Family Patterns.
Slater, P. E., & Goode, W. J. (1964) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2092135 · Cited by 1,249
The genetics of human populations
(1974) · Journal of Human Evolution · doi:10.1016/0047-2484(74)90135-3 · Cited by 713
Intelligence and family size: A paradox resolved
Higgins, J. V., Reed, E. W., & Reed, S. C. (1982) · Biodemography and Social Biology · doi:10.1080/19485565.1982.9988492 · Cited by 122
Bajema, C. J. (1963) · Social Biology · doi:10.1080/19485565.1963.9987564 · Cited by 102
Introduction to production economics
Black, J. D. (1926) · University of Michigan Library Repository · Cited by 36
Cited by
The Economic Costs of Pain in the United States
Gaskin, D. J., & Richard, P. (2012) · The Journal of Pain · doi:10.1016/j.jpain.2012.03.009 · Cited by 2,359
Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis
Manser, M., & Brown, M. (1980) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526238 · Cited by 1,972
Collective Labor Supply and Welfare
Chiappori, P.-A. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261825 · Cited by 1,811
(2009) · Markets and Diversity · doi:10.2307/j.ctv1kz4h99.12 · Cited by 1,684
Oppenheimer, V. K. (1988) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/229030 · Cited by 1,353
Metadata
- Authors
- Becker, G. S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1973-07
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 813-846
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2029022404
- Cited by
- 3,484
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 23.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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