The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs
Abstract
An economic theory of the effectiveness of industrial pressure groups in obtaining favorable tariffs is developed and tested for the United States Tariff Act of 1824. Import duties bestow nonexclusive benefits on factors of production or costs on product users. From the theory of public goods, it is postulated that small, homogeneous, geographically concentrated groups would react more intensely to the expected effects of tariffs in attempting to influence the legislature. However, in Congress (where majority support was necessary) it was a disadvantage for an import duty to be identified as too local or narrow an interest. This paper attempts empirically to sort out these conflicting forces, and finds inter alia that the ideal industry pressure groups in 1824 had low proprietorial income shares and geographically concentrated production units, but that political effectiveness required the group to speak for many establishments with output spread fairly evenly across states.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, by Mancur Olson
Latham, E. (1967) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2147334 · Cited by 1,551
Institutional Change and American Economic Growth.
Erickson, C., Davis, L. E., & North, D. C. (1972) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2552906 · Cited by 673
American Business and Public Policy. The Politics of Foreign Trade
R., P., Bauer, R. A., de Sola Pool, I., & Dexter, L. A. (1965) · Revue Française de Sociologie · doi:10.2307/3320050 · Cited by 513
Mussa, M. (1974) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260271 · Cited by 441
Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and ExternalitiesPreprint
Arrow, K. J. (1970) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 350
Volwiler, A. T., & Schattschneider, E. E. (1936) · The Mississippi Valley Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1886418 · Cited by 302
Protective and Preferential Import Duties.
Bickerdike, C. F., & Pigou, A. C. (1907) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2220786 · Cited by 70
The impact of the ante-bellum tariff on income distribution
Pope, C. L. (1971) · Explorations in Economic History · doi:10.1016/0014-4983(71)90067-2 · Cited by 30
The Effective Rate of Protection and the Question of Labor Protection in the United States
Travis, W. P. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259415 · Cited by 28
Effects of Protection in a General Equilibrium Framework
Evans, H. D. (1971) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925710 · Cited by 14
Cited by
TOLLISON, R. D. (1982) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1982.tb00174.x · Cited by 785
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
Denzau, A. T., & Munger, M. C. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957085 · Cited by 709
Open economy politics: A critical review
Lake, D. A. (2009) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-009-9060-y · Cited by 381
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Milner, H. V. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.91 · Cited by 307
Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?
Milner, H. V., & Judkins, B. (2004) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00293.x · Cited by 304
Metadata
- Authors
- Pincus, J. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1975-08
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 757-778
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1981449661
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 18.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.