The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
Abstract
In a variety of contexts, individuals must be allocated to positions with limited capacities. Legislators must be assigned to committees, college students to dormitories, and urban homesteaders to dwellings. (A general class of fair division problems would have the positions represent goods.) This paper examines the general problem of achieving efficient allocations when individuals' preferences are unknown and where (as with a growing number of nonmarket allocation schemes) there is no facilitating external medium of exchange such as money. An implicit market procedure is developed that elicits honest preferences, that assigns individuals efficiently, and that is adaptable to a variety of distributional objectives.
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Citations
Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
Linear Programming and Extensions
Dantzig, G. (1963) · RAND Corporation eBooks · doi:10.7249/r366 · Cited by 5,755
(2015) · Adversarial Risk Analysis · doi:10.1201/b18653-3 · Cited by 3,632
Baudier, E., & Debreu, G. (1959) · Cited by 2,545
The Computation of Economic Equilibria.
Binmore, K., Scarf, H. E., & Hansen, T. (1974) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2344737 · Cited by 849
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
Groves, T., & Ledyard, J. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912672 · Cited by 823
1. A Certain Zero-sum Two-person Game Equivalent to the Optimal Assignment Problem
Neumann, J. V. (1953) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II · doi:10.1515/9781400881970-002 · Cited by 483
A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices
Tideman, T. N., & Tullock, G. (1976) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260505 · Cited by 306
Introduction to General Equilibrium Theory and Welfare Economics.
Whitaker, J., Quirk, J., & Saposnik, R. (1971) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2552589 · Cited by 258
Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
Gibbard, A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914235 · Cited by 112
Cited by
The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
Roth, A. E. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261272 · Cited by 1,219
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
Balinski, M., & Sönmez, T. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2469 · Cited by 565
Mechanism design for social good
Abebe, R., & Goldner, K. (2018) · AI Matters · doi:10.1145/3284751.3284761 · Cited by 45
Metadata
- Authors
- Hylland, A., & Zeckhauser, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1979-04
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 293-314
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2008751404
- Cited by
- 549
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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