The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis
Abstract
Human capital theorists have traditionally argued that individuals invest in education until the marginal gain in productivity is equal to the marginal opportunity cost. However, the observed correlations among income, education, and ability measures are also consistent with education being used to screen for exogenous ability differences. This paper tests for such an informational role, arguing that screening will be much more important in some occupations than in others. Subsamples of "screened" and "unscreened" occupations are isolated and compared. It is concluded that observed differences, not readily explained by the traditional model, are consistent with the educational screening hypothesis.
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Citations
Cites
Individual Comparisons by Ranking Methods
Wilcoxon, F. (1945) · Biometrics Bulletin · doi:10.2307/3001968 · Cited by 15,354
Arrow, K. J. (1973) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(73)90013-3 · Cited by 5,121
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885326 · Cited by 4,987
The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259291 · Cited by 2,657
The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income
Stiglitz, J. E. (1975) · Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University) · doi:10.7916/d8pg22pm · Cited by 1,353
Information in the Labor Market
Stigler, G. J. (1962) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258727 · Cited by 1,112
Learning and Experience in the Labor Market
Rosen, S. (1972) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/145087 · Cited by 429
The Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education
Layard, R., & Psacharopoulos, G. (1974) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260251 · Cited by 380
Where Are We in the Theory of Information
Hirshleifer, J. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 252
Higher Education, Mental Ability, and Screening
Taubman, P. J., & Wales, T. J. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260005 · Cited by 194
Cited by
Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination
Altonji, J. G., & Pierret, C. R. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301556329 · Cited by 894
Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages
Weiss, A. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.4.133 · Cited by 770
Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling
Riley, J. G. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.432 · Cited by 704
Self-citationSheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education
Hungerford, T., & Solon, G. (1987) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1937919 · Cited by 461
Credentials, Signals, and Screens: Explaining the Relationship Between Schooling and Job Assignment
Bills, D. B. (2003) · Review of Educational Research · doi:10.3102/00346543073004441 · Cited by 436
Metadata
- Authors
- Riley, J. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1979-10
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 5, Part 2
- Pages
- S227-S252
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1965830684
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 10.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.