The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers
Abstract
This paper explores a model where private charity and public transfers are determined simultaneously. In political equilibrium, the government "overprovides" public transfers, transferring more to the poor than altruistic taxpayers prefer. At this equilibrium, private charity is zero. Evidence for this result is found by examining various types of data from the 1920s to the present. While private charity currently exceeds $50 billion, very little of it goes to the poor. I provide evidence that this phenomenon of zero private charity began, as the model predicts, in the 1930s, the beginning of federal intervention in the charity market.
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Citations
Cites
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity
Warr, P. G. (1982) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(82)90056-1 · Cited by 506
Cited by
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825
Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence
Andreoni, J. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261662 · Cited by 3,162
On the private provision of public goods
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., & Varian, H. (1986) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1 · Cited by 2,267
Motives for Private Income Transfers
Cox, D. (1987) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261470 · Cited by 1,236
Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens
Le Grand, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199266999.001.0001 · Cited by 922
Metadata
- Authors
- Roberts, R. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1984-02
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 136-148
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1993996160
- Cited by
- 552
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 61.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Roberts, R. D. (1984). A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261212
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.