The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Informational Externalities and Welfare-Reducing Speculation
Open accessAbstract
Introducing more speculators into the market for a given commodity leads to improved risk sharing but can also change the informational content of prices. This inflicts an externality on those traders already in the market, whose ability to make inferences based on current prices will be affected. In some cases, the externality is negative: the entry of new speculators lowers the informativeness of the price to existing traders. The net result can be one of price destabilization and welfare reduction. This is true even when all agents are rational, risk-averse, competitors who make the best possible use of their available information.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Allen, C. L., & Friedman, M. (1954) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1053873 · Cited by 3,204
Hutchison, T. W., & Friedman, M. (1954) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228046 · Cited by 2,999
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION
Grossman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01907.x · Cited by 1,437
On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
Hellwig, M. F. (1980) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(80)90056-3 · Cited by 1,241
Information, futures prices, and stabilizing speculation
Danthine, J.-P. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90124-2 · Cited by 391
The Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational Externalities
Grossman, S. J. (1977) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296900 · Cited by 323
Price Destabilizing Speculation
Hart, O., & Kreps, D. M. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261418 · Cited by 245
Cited by
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., & Waldmann, R. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261703 · Cited by 6,234
A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets
Hong, H., & Stein, J. C. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00184 · Cited by 4,001
Self-citationHave Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk
Campbell, J. Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B. G., & Xu, Y. (2001) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00318 · Cited by 2,415
Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation
DE LONG, J. B., SHLEIFER, A., SUMMERS, L. H., & WALDMANN, R. J. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03695.x · Cited by 2,192
Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance
Shleifer, A. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198292279.001.0001 · Cited by 1,236
Metadata
- Authors
- Stein, J. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1987-12
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1123-1145
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2002617706
- Cited by
- 433
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 15.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Informational Externalities and Welfare-Reducing Speculation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261508
- The paper
- Stein, J. C. (1987). Informational Externalities and Welfare-Reducing Speculation. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261508
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.