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Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?
Abstract
This paper empirically examines one motive for takeovers: to change control of firms that make acquisitions that diminish the value of their equity. Firms that subsequently become takeover targets make acquisitions that significantly reduce their equity value, and firms that do not become takeover targets make acquisitions that raise their equity value. Within the sample of acquisition by targets, the acquisitions that reduce equity value the most are those that are later divested either in bust-up takeovers or restructuring programs to thwart the takeover. This evidence is consistent with theories advanced by Marris, Manne, and Jensen concerning the disciplinary role played by takeovers.
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Citations
Cited by
FAMA, E. F. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x · Cited by 5,350
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Self-citationDo Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05079.x · Cited by 1,887
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
MASULIS, R. W., WANG, C., & XIE, F. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x · Cited by 1,772
The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring activity
Mitchell, M. L., & Mulherin, J. H. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00860-h · Cited by 1,511
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Mitchell, M. L., & Lehn, K.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-04
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 372-398
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1997433126
- Cited by
- 417
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 50.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Mitchell, M. L., & Lehn, K. (1990). Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets? Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261682
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.