The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?
Open accessAbstract
Insider trading moves forward the resolution of uncertainty. Using a rational expectations model with endogenous investment level, I show that, when insider trading is permitted, (i) stock prices better reflect information and will be higher on average, (ii) expected real investment will rise, (iii) markets are less liquid, (iv) owners of investment projects and insiders will benefit, and (v) outside investors and liquidity traders will be hurt. Total welfare may increase or decrease depending on the economic environment. Factors that favor the prohibition of insider trading are identified.
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Citations
Cites
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Kyle, A. S. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913210 · Cited by 9,580
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
MILLER, M. H., & ROCK, K. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02362.x · Cited by 3,441
The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity
HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1978) · Uncertainty in Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-214850-7.50038-3 · Cited by 1,571
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION
Grossman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01907.x · Cited by 1,437
On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
Hellwig, M. F. (1980) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(80)90056-3 · Cited by 1,241
Market Liquidity, Hedging, and Crashes
Gennotte, G., & Leland, H. E. (1990) · American Economic Review · Cited by 530
Self-citationInsider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices
Fishman, M. J., & Hagerty, K. M. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555435 · Cited by 453
Insider Trading and the Stock Market
Poser, N. S., & Manne, H. G. (1967) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1071677 · Cited by 403
The Regulation of Insider Trading
Carlton, D. W., & Fischel, D. R. (2004) · Economic Analysis of the Law · doi:10.1002/9780470752135.ch20 · Cited by 245
Sunshine Trading and Financial Market Equilibrium
Admanti, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (1991) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/4.3.443 · Cited by 243
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market
Laffont, J., & Maskin, E. S. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261669 · Cited by 154
Market Power in a Securities Market with Endogenous Information
Grinblatt, M. S., & Ross, S. A. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885678 · Cited by 54
Cited by
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
Corporate governance and blockchains
Yermack, D. (2017) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfw074 · Cited by 1,082
The Real Effects of Financial Markets
Bond, P., Edmans, A., & Goldstein, I. (2012) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110311-101826 · Cited by 886
Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information Before Others
HIRSHLEIFER, D., SUBRAHMANYAM, A., & TITMAN, S. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04777.x · Cited by 723
Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention
Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.45483 · Cited by 664
Metadata
- Authors
- Leland, H. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1992-08
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 859-887
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2151487897
- Cited by
- 588
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 18.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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