The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality
Abstract
We report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by "zero-intelligence" programs that submit random bids and offers. Imposing a budget constraint (i.e., not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values) is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent. Allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure, independent of traders' motivation, intelligence, or learning. Adam Smith's invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought; it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality.
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Citations
Cites
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.
Loasby, B. J., Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1983) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232409 · Cited by 21,366
An evolutionary theory of economic change
Winter, & Sidney, G. (1982) · Cited by 6,407
Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory
Alchian, A. A. (1950) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256940 · Cited by 3,985
Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory
Becker, G. S. (1962) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258584 · Cited by 1,156
An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior
(1991) · Papers in Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.003 · Cited by 1,019
On the Efficiency of Experimental Double Auction Markets
Friedman, D. (1984) · American Economic Review · Cited by 108
A Comparative Analysis of Efficiency of Economic Institutions with Zero Intelligence Traders.Preprint
Dhananjay, K. G., & Sunder, S. (1992) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 3
Self-citation
Cited by
Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again.
van Gelder, T., & Clark, A. (1998) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998391 · Cited by 3,128
Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions
DENZAU, A. T., & NORTH, D. C. (1994) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02246.x · Cited by 2,194
Hodgson, G. M. (2006) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2006.11506879 · Cited by 2,108
An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets
MacKenzie, D. (2006) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262134606.001.0001 · Cited by 1,766
Peripheral Vision: Economic Markets as Calculative Collective Devices
Callon, M., & Muniesa, F. (2005) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840605056393 · Cited by 1,378
Metadata
- Authors
- Gode, D. K., & Sunder, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1993-02
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 119-137
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2018567859
- Cited by
- 1,652
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 12.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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