The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior
Open accessAbstract
Self-reporting --the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority --is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation.We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement.Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face uncertain sanctions.
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Cited by
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Wright, L., Muenster, R. M., Vecchione, B., Qu, T., Cai, P. (., Smith, A., Comm 2450 Student Investigators, Metcalf, J., & Matias, J. N. (2024) · The 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3630106.3658998 · Cited by 43
Null Compliance: NYC Local Law 144 and the Challenges of Algorithm Accountability
Wright, L., Muenster, R. M., Vecchione, B., Qu, T., Pika, Cai, Investigators, C. 2. S., Metcalf, J., & Matias, J. N. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2406.01399 · Cited by 43
Harelimana, V., Gao, Z. J., Nyiranteziryayo, E., & Nwankwegu, A. S. (2020) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.120677 · Cited by 14
Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence
Bigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S.-O., Le Coq, C., & Spagnolo, G. (2015) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewv006
Metadata
- Authors
- Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1994-06
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 583-606
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1998283667
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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