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Cited by 623

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation

Zwiebel, Jeffrey·1995·Journal of Political Economy
DOI 10.1086/261973
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Abstract

This paper demonstrates that in a simple setting with managerial concern for reputation and asymmetric information on ability, most managers may refrain from undertaking innovations that stochastically dominate an industry standard. Common components of uncertainty lead to market inferences of managerial ability based on relative performance. Managers who undertake the industry standard are consequently evaluated with a more accurate benchmark than those innovating. Discontinuities in compensation when performance is low (because of firings) lead managers to have differing valuations of an accurate benchmark, depending on type. In particular, very high and very low ability managers are more likely to undertake superior innovations than those of average ability.

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Metadata

Authors
Zwiebel, J.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
1995-02
Volume
103
Issue
1
Pages
1-25
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
DOI
10.1086/261973
OpenAlex
W2088614566
Cited by
623
References
13
FWCI
34.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261973
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Zwiebel, J. (1995). Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261973

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.