The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Abstract
This paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system. The problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk‐averse agent‐the unemployed worker‐and a risk‐neutral principal, which cannot monitor the agent's search effort. The optimal long‐term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized. This contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that, under some mild regularity conditions, increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell. Some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large. The performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Chetty, R. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/588585 · Cited by 853
Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods
Chetty, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142910 · Cited by 666
A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance
Chetty, R. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.01.004 · Cited by 361
Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics
Balke, N., & Lamadon, T. (2022) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161622 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Hopenhayn, H. A., & Nicolini, J. P.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1997-04
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 412-438
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2052888666
- Cited by
- 588
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 25.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimal Unemployment Insurance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/262078
- The paper
- Hopenhayn, H. A., & Nicolini, J. P. (1997). Optimal Unemployment Insurance. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/262078
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
