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Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

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Dekel, Eddie, Piccione, Michele·2000·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

We explore sequential voting in symmetric two‐option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultancous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all sequential structures. We also explore the relationship between simultaneous and sequential voting in other contexts. We illustrate several instances in which sequential voting does no better at aggregating information than simultaneous voting. The inability of the sequential structure to use additional information in voting models is distinct from that in the herd‐cascade literature.

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Metadata

Authors
Dekel, E., & Piccione, M.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
2000-02
Volume
108
Issue
1
Pages
34-55
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W1984102369
Cited by
212
References
0
FWCI
9.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/262110
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Dekel, E., & Piccione, M. (2000). Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/262110

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