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Cited by 258Philosophy, Science, and HistoryRelativity and Gravitational TheoryQuantum Mechanics and Applications

On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future

Stein, Howard·1991·Philosophy of Science
DOI 10.1086/289609
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Abstract

It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or “becoming”) that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered.

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  • In special relativity, any binary relation 'is definite as of' adapted to temporally oriented Minkowski spacetime must coincide with 'is in the causal past of' lest it degenerate into the trivial or universal relation, modulo a choice of temporal direction.

    “In special relativity, Stein's theorem tells us, essentially, that any binary relation 'is definite as of' adapted to the structure of temporally oriented Minkowski spacetime must coincide with 'is in the causal past of' lest it degenerate into the trivial or the universal relation, modulo a choice of temporal direction.”

    From What Becomes of a Causal Set? (2017) · cites this paper as Stein (1991)

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Authors
Stein, H.
Affiliations
University of Chicago (US)
Corresponding author
Stein, Howard
Venue
Philosophy of Science
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1991-06
Volume
58
Issue
2
Pages
147-167
ISSN
  • 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-767X
DOI
10.1086/289609
OpenAlex
W2040017667
Cited by
258
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 4
FWCI
9.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 11262 d)
Locations
Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (8808575)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Astronomy and Astrophysics › Relativity and Gravitational Theory
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Mechanics and Applications
Keywords
special relativity, indeterminism, becoming, philosophy of time, quantum mechanics, determinism

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