The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements
Abstract
The failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court-mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female-headed households. This paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children's welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce. The point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother. Within marriage, proximity and altruism serve to overcome the "free-rider" problem associated with the provision of public goods. However, on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a Pareto-optimal allocation of their joint resources. A model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event of divorce. The settlement consists of the determination of custody and transfer of income to the custodial parent. Divorce is endogenous in our model and its occurrence depends on a random variable introduced into the family budget constraint that measures the quality of the marriage match. The analysis yields several useful insights. In addition to explaining the apparently insufficient support by custodians we explain why custody rights and alimony transfers often go in the same direction, most commonly to the wife, and why uneven distribution of income between the spouses increases the probability of divorce.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Becker, G. S. (1991) · doi:10.4159/9780674020665 · Cited by 10,565
An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability
Becker, G. S., Landes, E. M., & Michael, R. T. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260631 · Cited by 1,739
Whalley, J., Atkinson, A. B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1982) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2553530 · Cited by 1,556
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce
Mnookin, R. H., & Kornhauser, L. (1979) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/795824 · Cited by 1,480
Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure
Samuelson, P. A. (1972) · Readings in Industrial Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15486-9_4 · Cited by 721
Weitzman, L. J. (1980) · UCLA law review · Cited by 61
Cited by
Family Structure, Father Involvement, and Adolescent Behavioral Outcomes
Carlson, M. J. (2006) · Journal of Marriage and Family · doi:10.1111/j.1741-3737.2006.00239.x · Cited by 457
What’s happening to the family? Interactions between demographic and institutional change
Bumpass, L. L. (1990) · Demography · doi:10.2307/2061566 · Cited by 436
The Economics and Psychology of Inequality and Human DEvelopment
Cunha, F., & Heckman, J. J. (2009) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2009.7.2-3.320 · Cited by 411
Religion as a Determinant of Economic and Demographic Behavior in the United States
Lehrer, E. L. (2004) · Population and Development Review · doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2004.00038.x · Cited by 411
Ginther, D. K., & Pollak, R. A. (2004) · Demography · doi:10.1353/dem.2004.0031 · Cited by 394
Metadata
- Authors
- Weiss, Y., & Willis, R. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1985-07
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 268-292
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2025912197
- Cited by
- 381
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 10.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.