The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Role of Leasing under Adverse Selection
Abstract
Leasing contracts are extensively used in durable goods markets. These contracts specify a rental rate and an option price at which the used good can be bought on termination of the lease. This option price cannot be controlled when the car is sold. We show that in a world in which quality is observable, this additional control variable is ineffective. Under adverse selection instead, leasing contracts affect equilibrium allocations in a way that matches observed behavior in the car market. Consistent with the data, our model predicts that leased cars have a higher turnover and that off‐lease used cars are of higher quality. Moreover, the model predicts that the recent increase in leasing can be explained by the observed increase in car durability. We show that leasing contracts can improve welfare but that they are imperfect tools. We also show that a producer with market power can benefit from leasing contracts for two reasons: market segmentation and better pricing of the option. Moreover, despite the fact that lessors could structure contracts to prevent adverse selection, we show that this is not in their interest.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Cited by
A more complete conceptual framework for SME finance
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (2006) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.05.008 · Cited by 1,992
Collaborative Consumption: Strategic and Economic Implications of Product Sharing
Jiang, B., & Tian, L. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2647 · Cited by 408
Leasing, Ability to Repossess, and Debt Capacity
Eisfeldt, A. L., & Rampini, A. A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn026 · Cited by 396
Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets
Waldman, M. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003321164985 · Cited by 316
Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning
Tirole, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.29 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Hendel, I., & Lizzeri, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-02
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 113-143
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2891360945
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 11.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Role of Leasing under Adverse Selection. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/324387
- The paper
- Hendel, I., & Lizzeri, A. (2002). The Role of Leasing under Adverse Selection. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/324387
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.