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On Group Stability in Hierarchies and Networks
Open accessAbstract
A hierarchical structure is a widespread organizational form in many areas. My aim in this paper is to provide a rationale for this fact based on two premises. First, a group organizes itself so as to achieve efficient coordination. Second, efficient coordination is achieved only if subgroups as well as individuals agree to cooperate. Even in situations in which there are gains to coordination, the agreement of each possible subgroup may be impossible to reach, resulting in instabilities. I argue that a hierarchical organization avoids such instabilities by distributing in an optimal way autonomy and blocking power to a restricted set of subgroups. Comparisons with nondirected networks are drawn.
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Cites
Graphs and Cooperation in Games
Myerson, R. B. (1977) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.2.3.225 · Cited by 1,446
Cited by
A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
Jackson, M. O. (2003) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · doi:10.7907/c4y9t-bg336 · Cited by 374
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M. (2012) · Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 · Cited by 337
A GENERIC APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION
APT, K. R., & WITZEL, A. (2009) · International Game Theory Review · doi:10.1142/s0219198909002352 · Cited by 325
The Economics of Social Networks
Jackson, M. O. (2013) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139052269.003 · Cited by 264
Metadata
- Authors
- Demange, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2004-08
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 754-778
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2014044674
- Cited by
- 209
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 18.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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