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The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options*
Open accessAbstract
Incentive options are held by managers and employees who invariably hold undiversified portfolios with substantial amounts invested in their own company's common stock. This lack of diversification makes the subjective value of incentive items such as options less than their market value. This paper derives a model for the marginal value of such options or other incentive items. As such, it can be used to evaluate heterogeneous options which mature on different dates. It can also be used each time a new option is granted. The identical model (with different parameters)can be used to determine three different values for each option, the market value, the subjective value and the objective values. The market value is the value the option would have if it were held by an unconstrained agent. The subjective value - the value of the holder - is less than the market value because the option is held in an undiversified portfolio and because it is exercised suboptimally from the market perspective. The objective value is the cost to the firm of issuing the option and lies between the market and subjective values. This value recognizes the suboptimal exercise but not the undiversified discount. The model is no more difficult to use than is the Black- Scholes model. In fact, under the same conditions, it is simply the Black-Scholes model with modified parameters. The model can also be easily extended to handle vesting, employment termination, indexing, repricing and any number of other features found in incentive options.
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Citations
Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Cited by
Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004 · Cited by 2,909
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
The Executive Turnover Risk Premium
PETERS, F. S., & WAGNER, A. F. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12166 · Cited by 388
Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay
DITTMANN, I., & MAUG, E. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01208.x · Cited by 357
Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives
Liu, Y., & Mauer, D. C. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.008 · Cited by 325
Metadata
- Authors
- Ingersoll, Jr.
- Venue
- The Journal of Business
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 453-487
- ISSN
- 0021-9398 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5374
- OpenAlex
- W3122637835
- Cited by
- 203
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 30.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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