The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
Abstract
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the “great reversal” phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weakened middle class became concerned about labor income risk associated with free markets and supported a more corporatist financial system.
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Cites
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00125-9 · Cited by 3,327
Cited by
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.285 · Cited by 3,220
On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility
LIANG, H., & RENNEBOOG, L. (2017) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12487 · Cited by 1,381
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13608 · Cited by 892
Finance, Firm Size, and Growth
BECK, T., DEMIRGUC‐KUNT, A., LAEVEN, L., & LEVINE, R. (2008) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00164.x · Cited by 682
Finance and inequality: Channels and evidence
Claessens, S., & Perotti, E. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2007.07.002 · Cited by 604
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Metadata
- Authors
- Perotti, E. C., & von Thadden, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 145-175
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1976548733
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 37.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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