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Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing
Open accessAbstract
We analyze an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. An optimum is implemented by an asset‐tested disability system in which a disability transfer is paid only if an agent has assets below a specified maximum. The logic behind this result is that an agent who plans to falsely claim disability (a) finds doing so unattractive if he does not adjust his savings and (b) cannot collect disability insurance if he does adjust his savings in the desired direction (upward). For a calibrated economy, we find that welfare gains from asset testing are significant.
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Citations
Cited by
The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendation
Diamond, P., & Saez, E. (2011) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.4.165 · Cited by 544
Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs
Deshpande, M., & Li, Y. (2019) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20180076 · Cited by 534
Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs
Deshpande, M., & Li, Y. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3342780 · Cited by 198
Metadata
- Authors
- Golosov, M., & Tsyvinski, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-04
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 257-279
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2243113223
- Cited by
- 242
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 50.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Golosov, M., & Tsyvinski, A. (2006). Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/500549
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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