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The Credit Rating Crisis

Benmelech, Efraim, Dlugosz, Jennifer·2010·NBER Macroeconomics Annual

Abstract

Previous articleNext article FreeThe Credit Rating CrisisEfraim Benmelech and Jennifer DlugoszEfraim BenmelechHarvard University and NBER Search for more articles by this author and Jennifer DlugoszFederal Reserve System Search for more articles by this author Harvard University and NBERFederal Reserve SystemPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreI. IntroductionBy December 2008, structured finance securities accounted for over $11 trillion worth of outstanding U.S. bond market debt (35%).1 The lion’s share of these securities was highly rated by rating agencies. More than half of the structured finance securities rated by Moody’s carried a AAA rating—the highest possible credit rating. In 2007 and 2008, the creditworthiness of structured finance securities deteriorated dramatically; 36,346 tranches rated by Moody’s were downgraded. Nearly one-third of downgraded tranches bore the AAA rating.Both academics and practitioners have blamed structured finance for being, in part, responsible for the current credit crisis. In September 2007, Princeton economist Alan Blinder wrote, “Part of the answer is that the securities, especially the now-notorious C.D.O.s, for collateralized debt obligations, were probably too complex for anyone’s good. Investors placed too much faith in the rating agencies which, to put it mildly, failed to get it right. It is tempting to take the rating agencies out for a public whipping. But it is more constructive to ask how the rating system might be improved” (Blinder 2007). The goal of our paper is to inform economists about the credit rating crisis of 2007–8. We begin by describing what happened to structured finance credit rating during the crisis. We then try to explain why the ratings collapsed. Using detailed information on rating decisions made by Moody’s for every structured finance tranche, we document the ratings performance of structured finance products since 1983. We augment the evidence on structured finance ratings performance with data on rating transitions of all corporate bonds rated by Moody’s over the same period. The data on corporate bonds are used as a benchmark for the true distribution of credit ratings that are based on economic fundamentals. The comparison is important since many of the new exotic structured finance products were engineered to obtain high ratings, but the credit ratings were determined through cash flow simulations that are prone to model errors.Decomposing structured finance downgrades by collateral type, we find that 64% of all downgrades in 2007 and 2008 were tied to securities that had home equity loans (HELs) or first mortgages as collateral. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by asset-backed securities (ABS) accounted for a large share of the downgrades and some of the most severe downgrades.2 ABS CDOs accounted for 42% of the total write-downs of financial institutions around the world. As of October 2008, Citigroup, AIG, and Merrill Lynch took write-downs totaling $34.1 billion, $33.2 billion, and $26.1 billion, respectively, because of ABS CDO exposure (see Table 1).Table 1 ABS CDOs and Crisis-Related Write-Downs ($ Millions)Write-DownsLatest AnnouncementABS CDOsCorporate CreditRMBSOtherTotalSelect financial institutions: Insurers/Asset managers: ACA Capital11/8/20071,700………1,700 AIG11/10/200833,190……33,75366,943 Ambac11/5/200811,1363601,04621912,761 MBIA5/12/20083,5001,600 1,8006,900 Prudential7/30/2008……3,410…3,410 North American banks: Bank of America1/16/20099,089932…2,83412,855 Bear Stearns1/29/20082,300………2,300 Citigroup10/16/200834,1064,0531,31915,90455,382 Goldman Sachs9/16/2008…4,1001,7001,4007,200 JP Morgan Chase1/15/20091,3005,4675,305…12,072 Lehman Brothers6/16/20082001,3004,1003,4009,000 Merrill Lynch10/16/200826,1002,84512,99813,12555,068 Morgan Stanley12/17/20087,8003,8103,7811,99217,383 European banks: Credit Suisse10/23/20083,4273,0575302,5239,537 Deutsche Bank10/30/20082,0925,8203,3863,67714,975 Fortis Bank8/4/20084,3593,660144…8,163 ING11/12/2008565…8,028258,618 Royal Bank of Scotland11/4/20083,6091,8492,5664,12212,146 UBS8/12/200821,8703481,71613,87137,805 Asian and emerging market banks: Aozora Bank5/15/2008510.0………510.0 Mitsubishi UFJ8/13/2008359.52,348921113,640 Mizuho11/13/20083,8986292,5395847,650 National Australia Bank10/21/2008669.5………669.5 Sumitomo Mitsui11/19/2007561.7………561.7Aggregate: Insurers/asset managers 61,0746,32010,38638,347116,127 North American banks 84,31923,70242,27259,011209,304 European banks 63,46418,57926,42362,634171,100 Asian and emerging market banks 9,3584,7245,7283,74323,553 Total 218,21553,32584,809163,735520,084Note: ABS = asset-backed securities; CDO = collateralized debt obligation; RMBS = residential mortgage-backed securities.View Table ImageUsing microlevel data on their collateral composition, we document three features of ABS CDOs: (i) high concentration

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Metadata

Authors
Benmelech, E., & Dlugosz, J.
Venue
NBER Macroeconomics Annual
Published
2010-01
Volume
24
Issue
1
Pages
161-208
ISSN
  • 0889-3365 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-2642
OpenAlex
W2161189733
Cited by
192
References
1
FWCI
30.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Benmelech, E., & Dlugosz, J. (2010). The Credit Rating Crisis. NBER Macroeconomics Annual. https://doi.org/10.1086/648293

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