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Cited by 723Monetary Policy and Economic ImpactFiscal Policies and Political EconomyEconomic theories and models

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Macroeconomics and Politics

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Alesina, Alberto·1988·NBER Macroeconomics Annual
DOI 10.1086/654070
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Abstract

The recent game-theoretic macroeconomic literature provides a useful tool for analyzing the relationship between political institutions and the macroeconomy. In particular, this paper examines two related issues: the effects of electoral competition on macroeconomic policy and on the economic cycle, and the role of different degrees of independence of the Central Bank as a determinant of monetary policy. The game-theoretic literature in this area has generated several results that are consistent with the empirical evidence. This claim is supported by reviewing the available empirical results and by performing several new tests. In particular, this paper emphasizes the different empirical implications of rational and optimizing politico-economic models in respect to non-rational approaches. Several open issues and new directions of research are also explored in the conclusions.

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Metadata

Authors
Alesina, A.
Affiliations
Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Corresponding author
Alesina, Alberto
Venue
NBER Macroeconomics Annual
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
1988-01
Volume
3
Pages
13-52
ISSN
  • 0889-3365 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-2642
DOI
10.1086/654070
OpenAlex
W2067275363
Cited by
723
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 19 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 20
FWCI
33.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • NBER Macroeconomics Annual (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
Keywords
political institutions, electoral competition, macroeconomic policy, business cycles, central bank independence, monetary policy, rational expectations

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