The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales
Open accessAbstract
This article investigates the pricing distortions that arise from the use of a common nonlinear incentive scheme at a leading enterprise software vendor. The empirical results demonstrate that salespeople are adept at gaming the timing of deal closure to take advantage of the vendor’s accelerating commission scheme. Specifically, salespeople agree to significantly lower pricing in quarters in which they have a financial incentive to close a deal, resulting in mispricing that costs the vendor 6%–8% of revenue. Robustness checks demonstrate that price discrimination by the vendor does not explain the identified effects.
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Cites
Matching As An Econometric Evaluation Estimator
Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. (1998) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00044 · Cited by 3,807
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
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Dixon, J., Hong, B., & Wu, L. (2021) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3812 · Cited by 463
Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Marathon Runners
Allen, E. J., Dechow, P. M., Pope, D. G., & Wu, G. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2417 · Cited by 324
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Self-citationHuman Resource Management and Productivity
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2010) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w16019 · Cited by 287
Metadata
- Authors
- Larkin, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2014-04
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 199-227
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2078261483
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 46.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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