The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts
Open accessAbstract
A cornerstone of the law and economics approach to standard-form contracts is the informed-minority hypothesis: in competitive markets, a minority of term-conscious buyers is sufficient to discipline sellers from using unfavorable boilerplate terms. This argument is often invoked to limit intervention or regulate consumer transactions, but there has been little empirical investigation of its validity. We track the Internet browsing behavior of 48,154 monthly visitors to the Web sites of 90 online software companies to study the extent to which potential buyers access the end-user license agreement. We find that only one or two of every 1,000 retail software shoppers access the license agreement and that most of those who do access it read no more than a small portion. Since the cost of comparison shopping online is so low, the limiting factor in becoming informed thus seems not to be the cost of accessing license terms but reading and comprehending them.
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“Given that consumers must also be offered the right to refuse the placing of such cookies, most online environments use (tracking-specific) cookie notifications, although few appear to read them (Bakos et al. 2014).”
From A note on the future of personalized pricing: cause for concern (2020) · cites this paper as Bakos et al. 2014
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Cited by
Obar, J. A., & Oeldorf-Hirsch, A. (2020) · Information, Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2018.1486870 · Cited by 771
“’ Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen (2014) conducted a similar clickstream assessment of more than 48,000 individuals visiting commercial software and freeware sites in January 2007.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bakos, Y., Marotta-Wurgler, F., & Trossen, D. R.
- ORCID
- Bakos, Yannis
- Venue
- The Journal of Legal Studies
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2014-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-35
- ISSN
- 0047-2530 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5366
- OpenAlex
- W3121736041
- Cited by
- 436
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 38 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 76 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 16
- FWCI
- 54.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Legal Studies (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
- Digital Commons @ The University of Maryland, Baltimore Carey Law (The University of Maryland, Baltimore) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Law › European and International Contract Law
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- standard form contracts, consumer attention, end-user license agreements, online software, consumer protection, law and economics
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