The Real Value of Equality
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article investigates how political theorists and philosophers should understand egalitarian political demands in light of the increasingly important realist critique of much of contemporary political theory and philosophy. It suggests, first, that what Martin O’Neill has called non-intrinsic egalitarianism is, in one form at least, a potentially realistic egalitarian political project and, second, that realists may be compelled to impose an egalitarian threshold on state claims to legitimacy under certain circumstances. Non-intrinsic egalitarianism can meet realism’s methodological requirements because it does not have to assume an unavailable moral consensus since it can focus on widely acknowledged bads rather than contentious claims about the good. Further, an appropriately formulated non-intrinsic egalitarianism may be a minimum requirement of an appropriately realistic claim by a political order to authoritatively structure some of its members’ lives. Without at least a threshold set of egalitarian commitments, a political order seems unable to be transparent to many of its worse-off members under a plausible construal of contemporary conditions.
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Citations
Cites
What Should Egalitarians Believe?
O'NEILL, M. (2008) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00130.x · Cited by 335
Legitimacy in Realist Thought: Between Moralism and Realpolitik
Sleat, M. (2014) · Political Theory · doi:10.1177/0090591714522250 · Cited by 119
Cited by
Political normativity and the functional autonomy of politics
Burelli, C. (2022) · European Journal of Political Theory · doi:10.1177/1474885120918500 · Cited by 42
A realistic conception of politics: conflict, order and political realism
Burelli, C. (2021) · Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy · doi:10.1080/13698230.2019.1604045 · Cited by 24
“…the realistic circumstances of politics when he states that political philosophy’s ‘practical role arise[s] from divisive political conflict and the need to settle the problem of order’ and indeed some realists granted that ‘Rawls is more realist than many realists realise’ (Jubb, 2015b, p. 919).”
BackgroundInfluentialTaking rulers' interests seriously: The case for realist theories of legitimacy
Cross, B. (2024) · European Journal of Political Theory · doi:10.1177/14748851221114302 · Cited by 11
“First, ruler-interested theories may exercise some degree of in fl uence over the actions of rulers by convincing them that certain courses of action are in their best interests (Beetz and Rossi 2017; Ci 2019; Jubb 2015).”
BackgroundNo Virtue Like Resilience: Machiavelli’s Realistic Justification of Democracy
Burelli, C. (2024) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217231191396 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Jubb, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2015-07
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 679-691
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W1942785640
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 19.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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