The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Auctions versus Posted Prices in Online Markets
Abstract
Auctions were very popular in the early days of internet commerce, but today online sellers mostly use posted prices. We model the choice between auctions and posted prices as a trade-off between competitive price discovery and convenience. Evidence from eBay fits the theory. We then show that the decline in auctions was not driven by compositional shifts in seller experience or items sold, but by changing seller incentives. We estimate the demand facing sellers and document falling sale probabilities and falling relative demand for auctions. Both favor posted prices; our estimates suggest the latter is more important for the auction decline. Survey evidence provides further support.
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Citations
Cited by
Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
Einav, L., Farronato, C., & Levin, J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015334 · Cited by 553
Self-citationMarket Mechanisms in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending
Wei, Z., & Lin, M. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2531 · Cited by 274
Metadata
- Authors
- Einav, L., Farronato, C., Levin, J., & Sundaresan, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2018-02
- Volume
- 126
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 178-215
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2262821013
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 14.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.