The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis
Abstract
Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem—the random problem selection mechanism—is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a “no complementarities at the top” condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Allais, M. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907921 · Cited by 4,112
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
Harsanyi, J. C. (1955) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257678 · Cited by 2,876
Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method
Becker, G. M., Degroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964) · Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830090304 · Cited by 2,640
Thaler, R. H., & Johnson, E. J. (1990) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.36.6.643 · Cited by 2,374
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
Schmeidler, D. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911053 · Cited by 2,303
A Definition of Subjective Probability
Anscombe, F. J., & Aumann, R. J. (1963) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177704255 · Cited by 1,743
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
Camerer, C. F., & Hogarth, R. M. (1999) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1023/a:1007850605129 · Cited by 1,428
Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study
Halevy, Y. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00755.x · Cited by 609
Cited by
Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk
Exley, C. L. (2016) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdv051 · Cited by 304
Enke, B. (2020) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa012 · Cited by 186
Metadata
- Authors
- Azrieli, Y., Chambers, C. P., & Healy, P. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2018-08
- Volume
- 126
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1472-1503
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2306700358
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 53.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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