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Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis

Azrieli, Yaron, Chambers, Christopher P., Healy, Paul J.·2018·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem—the random problem selection mechanism—is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a “no complementarities at the top” condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.

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Metadata

Authors
Azrieli, Y., Chambers, C. P., & Healy, P. J.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
2018-08
Volume
126
Issue
4
Pages
1472-1503
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2306700358
Cited by
293
References
49
FWCI
53.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/698136
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Azrieli, Y., Chambers, C. P., & Healy, P. J. (2018). Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/698136

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