The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct
Abstract
We document the economywide extent of misconduct among financial advisers and the associated labor market consequences. Seven percent of advisers have misconduct records, and this share reaches more than 15 percent at some of the largest firms. Roughly one-third of advisers with misconduct are repeat offenders. Approximately half of advisers lose their jobs after misconduct. The labor market partially undoes firm-level discipline by rehiring such advisers. Firms that persistently engage in misconduct coexist with firms that have clean records. We show that this phenomenon may be explained by some firms “specializing” in misconduct and catering to unsophisticated consumers.
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Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467038 · Cited by 4,827
GUISO, L., SAPIENZA, P., & ZINGALES, L. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01408.x · Cited by 2,237
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Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
DYCK, A., MORSE, A., & ZINGALES, L. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x · Cited by 1,858
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505 · Cited by 1,426
SRINIVASAN, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00172.x · Cited by 1,044
Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.012 · Cited by 1,039
Financial literacy and retirement planning in the United States
LUSARDI, A., & MITCHELL, O. S. (2011) · Journal of Pension Economics and Finance · doi:10.1017/s147474721100045x · Cited by 911
Cited by
Gomes, F., Haliassos, M., & Ramadorai, T. (2021) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20201461 · Cited by 396
Alempaki, D., Burdea, V., & Read, D. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3925318 · Cited by 278
Metadata
- Authors
- Egan, M., Matvos, G., & Seru, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2019-02
- Volume
- 127
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 233-295
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W3123112479
- Cited by
- 410
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 100.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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