The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
THE OPTIMAL SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS AND THE DISTORTIONARY COST OF TAXATION
Abstract
The conventional view of economists is that the optimal supply of public goods must directly take into account the cost of financing them with distortionary taxes, notably the income tax. However, this article demonstrates, under standard simplifying assumptions, that it is possible to finance a public good in a manner that results in no additional distortion, by using an adjustment to the income tax that offsets the benefits of the public good. In this case, it is optimal to supply the public good whenever the simple costbenefit test is satisfied. The article also shows that if a different tax adjustment is made, the difference in outcome will be purely redistributive; thus, any change in distortionary costs will be accompanied by an opposing change in redistributive benefits. In this case, the cost-benefit test should be modified to reflect both of these changes. Finally, it is explained that the present analysis is fully applicable to determining the optimal level of environmental taxes.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice
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Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation
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How much do we care about absolute versus relative income and consumption?
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The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics
Kaplow, L. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400839223 · Cited by 344
Self-citationAddressing climate change through price and non-price interventions
Stiglitz, J. E. (2019) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.05.007 · Cited by 257
Metadata
- Authors
- KAPLOW, L.
- Venue
- National Tax Journal
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1996-12-01
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 513-533
- ISSN
- 0028-0283 (ISSN-L)
- 1944-7477
- OpenAlex
- W3136089047
- Cited by
- 332
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 15.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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