Grene on Mechanism and Reductionism: More Than Just a Side Issue
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Two summers ago Marjorie Grene described a mutual acquaintance as a young fogy. That immediately suggested a fourfold classification: Young fogies, old fogies, young turks and old turks. Marjorie's place in this classification is obvious; moreover, it is relevant to today's session. Were she just out of graduate school we would wait awhile to honor her. Here she a fogy we wouldn't bother. One of the ways Grene has expressed her anti-fogyism has been her consistent attacks on reductionism, especially reductionism in the philosophy of biology. In this paper I want to discuss the common association between ontological reductionism and a methodological position I will call mechanism. I wish to make three major points: (1) Mechanism (as I characterize it) is not to be identified with reductionism in any of its forms; in fact, mechanism leads to a nonreductionist ontology.
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Citations
Cites
Mayr, E. (1961) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.134.3489.1501 · Cited by 1,950
Cited by
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392759 · Cited by 3,179
Darden, L. (2002) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/341858 · Cited by 164
“Talk of mechanisms is ubiquitous in biology (as noted by, e.g., Wimsatt 1972; Brandon 1985; Burian 1996).”
BackgroundFirst principles in the life sciences: the free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism
Colombo, M., & Wright, C. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01932-w · Cited by 101
“Regarding its role in theorizing, FEP conflicts with tenets of two of the most prominent contemporary theoretical approaches in the life sciences: organicism (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000; Soto et al. 2016) andmechanism (Brandon 1984; Bechtel andRichardson 1993/2010).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Brandon, R. N.
- Venue
- PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 1984
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 344-353
- ISSN
- 0270-8647 (ISSN-L)
- 2327-9486
- OpenAlex
- W2312720421
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 2.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Brandon, R. N. (1984). Grene on Mechanism and Reductionism: More Than Just a Side Issue. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1984.2.192513
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