The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions
Abstract
The term ‘consequentialism’ refers to a class of moral theories that rank states of affairs from an impersonal standpoint and require agents to produce the best states of affairs they can. Many philosophers have criticized and rejected consequentialist theories, but Scheffler wishes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He begins by discussing two objections to consequentialism, one having to do with the integrity of agents and the other with distributive justice. From there, he outlines a hybrid moral theory that avoids these two objections. Scheffler's hybrid theory agrees with consequentialism in so far as it always permits agents to produce the best states of affairs, but it departs from consequentialism by including an ‘agent‐centred prerogative’, allowing each agent to assign greater weight to his own interests than to those of others. Scheffler argues that this prerogative rests on a principled rationale—namely, that it is a rational strategy for taking into account the independence of the personal point of view. But this rationale does not support ‘agent‐centred restrictions’—norms that sometimes forbid agents from doing what would have the best outcome overall. Scheffler searches for, but does not find, a separate rationale for agent‐centred restrictions.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Understanding and Applying Research Paradigms in Educational Contexts
Kivunja, C., & Kuyini, A. B. (2017) · International Journal of Higher Education · doi:10.5430/ijhe.v6n5p26 · Cited by 1,216
Focus group methodology: some ethical challenges
Sim, J., & Waterfield, J. (2019) · Quality & Quantity · doi:10.1007/s11135-019-00914-5 · Cited by 497
The Moral Demands of Affluence
Cullity, G. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199258112.001.0001 · Cited by 325
How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?
Voorhoeve, A. (2014) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/677022 · Cited by 303
The ethics of care: Role obligations and moderate partiality in health care
Nortvedt, P., Hem, M. H., & Skirbekk, H. (2011) · Nursing Ethics · doi:10.1177/0969733010388926 · Cited by 84
Metadata
- Authors
- Scheffler, S.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1994-08-11
- OpenAlex
- W4211128663
- Cited by
- 478
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 1.84
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0198235119.001.0001
- The paper
- Scheffler, S. (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198235119.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.