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Deception and Division
Abstract
Continues the theme of the preceding chapters, examining further the possibility of irrational thought and action, judged against a background that stipulates large‐scale rationality as a necessary condition for both interpretability and possession of a mind. Concentrates on the phenomenon of self‐deception, which the author holds to include ‘weakness of the warrant’, a phenomenon that violates what Hempel and Carnap have called ‘the requirement of total evidence for inductive reasoning’. The main tool to remove the paradox of self‐deception, according to the author, is the recognition of the idea that there can be boundaries between parts of the mind. Such boundaries, however, are not discovered by introspection, but are conceptual aids to the coherent description of genuine irrationalities.
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Citations
Cited by
Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography
Macarthur, D., & Malpas, J. E. (2001) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/3182610 · Cited by 462
Halpern, J., Paolo, D., & Huang, A. (2019) · Journal of Medical Ethics · doi:10.1136/medethics-2018-105226 · Cited by 34
Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation
Szanto, T. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02002 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Davidson, D.
- Venue
- Problems of Rationality
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2004-03-25
- Pages
- 199-212
- OpenAlex
- W2501456285
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 92.88
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.