The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 64 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Being Known
Abstract
The Integration Challenge is the task of reconciling a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a given kind with a credible account of how we can know those statements, when we do know them. In any domain for which the challenge is difficult, we may revise either our conception of the epistemology of that domain, or our conception of its metaphysics, or both. Successfully meeting the Integration Challenge involves the development of a theory of understanding with both metaphysical and epistemological dimensions. Understanding involves an integrated grasp both of truth conditions, and, via a theory of possession conditions, and of circumstances in which one can come to know that certain of those conditions obtain. Two different models for meeting the Integration Challenge can be developed: the model of constitutive causal sensitivity and the model of implicitly known principles. A model of the first kind is developed for a realistic account of our understanding of past‐tense contents. A model of the second kind is developed for our understanding of contents involving metaphysical necessity; an account that treats modal statements as not mind‐dependent, but not as involving Lewisian modal realism. The Integration Challenge is also addressed for various classical and recent problems of philosophy: the nature of one's knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states; the distinctive nature of first‐person knowledge; and the classical problem of the freedom of the will.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Madden, E. H., Goodman, N., & Melsen, A. G. V. (1955) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2103789 · Cited by 4,377
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 · Cited by 4,215
Kant, I. (1998) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804649 · Cited by 4,141
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers
(1975) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251 · Cited by 3,918
Science, Perception and Reality
Burrell, D. B., & Philosophical Studies, W. S. F. T. N. U. O. I. (1964) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.5840/philstudies196413091 · Cited by 2,215
Strawson, P. F. (2002) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203221303 · Cited by 2,127
Williams, C. J. F. (1979) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1979.tb01788.x · Cited by 1,906
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Goldman, A. I. (1976) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025679 · Cited by 1,870
Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.36-1926 · Cited by 1,799
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174503 · Cited by 1,633
Cited by
Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief
Greco, J. (2003) · Intellectual Virtue · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0006 · Cited by 360
Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge
Bar-On, D. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199276285.001.0001 · Cited by 286
Metadata
- Authors
- Peacocke, C.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1999-03-25
- OpenAlex
- W4248425176
- Cited by
- 453
- References
- 64
- FWCI
- 49.99
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Being Known. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0198238606.001.0001
- The paper
- Peacocke, C. (1999). Being Known. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198238606.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.