The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
Abstract
This essay argues that giving the reason for which an action was done, thus ‘rationalizing’ it, is giving a causal explanation––a claim that ran counter to the then prevailing orthodoxy inspired by the later Wittgenstein. We rationalize an action, says Davidson, by specifying the agent's intention; i.e. we specify that the agent did something X because he desired such and such and believed that doing X would bring about what he desired. Because intentions (‘primary reasons’) are composed of beliefs and desires, they do not themselves refer to distinct entities such as acts of will; further, on the basis of those beliefs and desires we can form practical syllogisms from which the desirability of the action (or its execution) follows deductively. In asking why an agent did such and such, we want to be given a reason that not only justifies his action but tells us for which reason he actually did it; for he might have had the justificatory reason, and acted, but not because of it––this ‘because’ must be specified causally lest the explanatory connection between reason and action be left utterly mysterious. By distinguishing events from how we describe them, Davidson discharges several objections to the causal thesis, among them the apparent logical distinctness that pertains to causal but not rationalized relata; he salvages the identification of beliefs and desires with ‘mental’ events, and stresses that action and the reason re‐describing it (which , we saw, presented no distinct entity) are not two distinct entities but only one under different descriptions.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science
Feigl, H., & Scriven, M. S. (1956) · Cited by 4,420
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.
Resnik, M. D., & Hempel, C. G. (1966) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2106169 · Cited by 3,319
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023833 · Cited by 2,405
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Wald, A., Neumann, J. V., & Morgenstern, O. (1947) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925651 · Cited by 2,329
McKinsey, J. C. C., & Reichenbach, H. (1948) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2305604 · Cited by 2,243
Strawson, P. F. (2002) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203221303 · Cited by 2,127
Sensations and Brain Processes
Smart, J. J. C. (1959) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2182164 · Cited by 1,584
Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour.
Barna, T., Neumann, J. V., & Morgenstern, O. (1946) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550081 · Cited by 1,285
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes
Quine, W. V. (1956) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2022451 · Cited by 1,174
An Argument for the Identity Theory
Lewis, D. K., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (1966) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024524 · Cited by 1,134
Cited by
Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry
Moreno, A., & Mossio, M. (2015) · History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9837-2 · Cited by 397
Reconciling Archer and Bourdieu in an Emergentist Theory of Action
Elder-Vass, D. (2007) · Sociological Theory · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9558.2007.00312.x · Cited by 260
Doing things with thoughts: brain–computer interfaces and disembodied agency
Steinert, S., Bublitz, C., Jox, R., & Friedrich, O. (2019) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-018-0308-4 · Cited by 117
Meaningful human control as reason-responsiveness: the case of dual-mode vehicles
Mecacci, G., & Santoni de Sio, F. (2020) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-019-09519-w · Cited by 82
Metadata
- Authors
- Davidson, D.
- Venue
- Essays on Actions and Events
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2001-09-27
- Pages
- 3-20
- OpenAlex
- W4302438536
- Cited by
- 481
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 5.75
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Actions, Reasons, and Causes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0199246270.003.0001
- The paper
- Davidson, D. (2001). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Essays on Actions and Events. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.