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The Right and the Good
Abstract
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ross, D.
- Affiliations
- British Academy (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Ross, David
- ORCID
- Ross, David
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2002-08-01
- OpenAlex
- W4212818722
- Cited by
- 658
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 64 · 2025: 95 · 2024: 39 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 97 · 2018: 21 · 2017: 43 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 2.28
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
- DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Social Sciences › Law › Legal Rights and Human Rights
- Keywords
- David Ross, ethical intuitionism, rightness, goodness, prima facie duties, consequentialism, moral theory, British philosophy
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