The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Things We Mean
Abstract
There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the relation between content-involving facts and underlying physical facts; vagueness and indeterminacy; conditionals; normative discourse; and the role of pleonastic propositions in explanation, prediction, and knowledge acquisition.
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Citations
Cites
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246270.001.0001 · Cited by 6,119
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 · Cited by 4,215
Burge, T., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1979) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.x · Cited by 2,807
Fine, K. (1975) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485047 · Cited by 1,602
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
Churchland, P. M. (1981) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025900 · Cited by 1,500
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0198237537.001.0001 · Cited by 1,295
Benacerraf, P. (1965) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183530 · Cited by 1,121
Stanley, J., Willlamson, T., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2001) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2678403 · Cited by 1,016
Lewis, D. (1983) · doi:10.1093/0195032047.001.0001 · Cited by 948
Burge, T. (1993) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185680 · Cited by 929
Cited by
Thomasson, A. L. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.001.0001 · Cited by 490
Borg, E. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199270252.001.0001 · Cited by 280
Grindrod, J. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1688178 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Schiffer, S.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2003-09-04
- OpenAlex
- W4253379236
- Cited by
- 574
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 15.05
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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