The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Open accessAbstract
Can octopuses feel pain and pleasure? What about crabs, shrimps, insects, or spiders? How do we tell whether a person unresponsive after severe brain injury might be suffering? When does a fetus in the womb start to have conscious experiences? Could there even be rudimentary feelings in miniature models of the human brain, grown from human stem cells? And what about AI? These are questions about the edge of sentience, and they are subject to enormous, disorienting uncertainty. The stakes are immense, and neglecting the risks can have terrible costs. We need to err on the side of caution, yet it’s often far from clear what ‘erring on the side of caution’ should mean in practice. When are we going too far? When are we not doing enough? The Edge of Sentience presents a comprehensive precautionary framework designed to help us reach ethically sound, evidence-based decisions despite our uncertainty.
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Consciousness and sentience are often conflated.
“The reason is that even though consciousness is distinct from sentience, i.e., positively or negatively valanced experience (pleasure, pain, etc.),foot_1 the two are often conflated (Birch, 2024).”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Birch, 2024
Consciousness is distinct from sentience, i.e., positively or negatively valanced experience.
“The reason is that even though consciousness is distinct from sentience, i.e., positively or negatively valanced experience (pleasure, pain, etc.),foot_1 the two are often conflated (Birch, 2024).”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Birch, 2024
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References 745 · Cited by 236
- Authors
- Birch, J.
- Affiliations
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Birch, Jonathan
- ORCID
- Birch, Jonathan
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2024-07-19
- OpenAlex
- W4400876317
- Cited by
- 236
- References
- 745
- Citations by year
- 2026: 139 · 2025: 93 · 2024: 4
- FWCI
- 128.53
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- London School of Economics and Political Science
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- sentience, animal sentience, pleasure and pain, brain injury, vegetative state, fetal consciousness, precautionary principle, animal welfare, human enhancement
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