The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do I Make a Difference?
Abstract
Abstract One important class of collective action problems consists of cases that are thought to have the following structure: if each of a large group of people perform a particular act, the overall results are bad, yet each individual can nonetheless truthfully say that it would make no difference—the results would be no better—if he had acted differently. The possibility of such cases seems to constitute a particular embarrassment for consequentialists, since it is precisely the undesirable consequences of everyone’s actions that is problematic here, yet consequentialism seems unable to criticize any of the relevant agents at all (given its focus on the results of each agent’s own actions). This essay distinguishes two pure types of cases of this sort—triggering cases, on the one hand, and imperceptible difference cases, on the other. It then argues that triggering cases can actually be handled straightforwardly by consequentialists, once the appropriate expected utility calculations are made. In contrast, imperceptible difference cases would indeed be problematic for consequentialism. But the essay argues that—surprisingly enough, and despite appearances—such cases are literally impossible. Accordingly, there is no need to go beyond familiar consequentialist theory to adequately deal with collective action problems of the kind discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
Brink, D. O. (1989) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624612 · Cited by 1,926
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174503 · Cited by 1,633
Utilitarianism: For and Against
Smart, J. J. C., & Williams, B. (1973) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511840852 · Cited by 1,174
Singer, P. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511975950 · Cited by 882
Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence
Unger, P. (1996) · doi:10.1093/0195108590.001.0001 · Cited by 879
Rachels, J. (1975) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejm197501092920206 · Cited by 827
Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection
Jackson, F. (1991) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/293312 · Cited by 783
Utilitarianism and Co-operation
Regan, D. H. (1980) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246091.001.0001 · Cited by 562
Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium
Singer, P., & The Hegeler Institute (1974) · Monist · doi:10.5840/monist197458330 · Cited by 401
Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives
NORCROSS, A. (1997) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.1997.tb00079.x · Cited by 321
Metadata
- Authors
- Kagan, S.
- Venue
- Philosophy & Public Affairs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-03-01
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 105-141
- ISSN
- 0048-3915 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1488737999
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 55.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.