Faith in Irenaeus’ Theological Epistemology

Abstract

Offing Irenaeus’ solution to the epistemic and soteriological problem that Chapter 1 defines, this chapter explores Irenaeus’ theological epistemology and its soteriological implications. Rejecting the Platonic idea that God can be known through intellection, Irenaeus instead holds that the first step towards rectifying the epistemic and soteriological separation between God and human beings is the incarnation of the Son of God (4.19.2; 4.20.5). In the incarnation, the simple and atemporal God becomes subject to the process of knowledge through sense-perception and the subsequent temporal processes—the philosophical epistemology outlined in the first chapter (5.17.2). For Irenaeus, the key to receiving that revelation lies in the individual’s capacity for pistis, “faith” or “belief,” a biblical term that Irenaeus understands in light of philosophical epistemology (3.20.2). In this framework (e.g. Pyrrho, Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle), faith is akin to an “opinion” or “judgement” that the soul makes in response to sense perceptory phenomena. It is this judgement or belief in response to God’s sense-perceptible self-revelation that constitutes the reception of God’s salvific, self-revelatory works in the soul, and ultimately enables right knowledge of God. Having sketched Irenaeus’ theological epistemology and the place of faith within it, the chapter concludes by showing that this epistemic sense of faith allows Irenaeus to treat faith as a principle that sustains the coherence in his belief that individual human beings receive salvation (4.6.3, 4.6.5–6), and by answering a question recently raised by John Behr as to the coherence of this theological epistemology in Irenaeus’ second-century context (3.4.2).