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A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science
Abstract
Abstract This book makes the contemporary philosophical literature on science and values accessible to a wide readership. It focuses on two questions: What are the major ways in which scientific reasoning can be influenced by values? and How can we tell whether those influences are appropriate or not? To address these questions, it examines case studies from a variety of research areas, including climate science, anthropology, chemical risk assessment, ecology, neurobiology, biomedical research, and agriculture. These cases show that the value-free ideal for science is problematic; values have important roles to play in identifying research topics, choosing research questions, determining the aims of inquiry, responding to uncertainty, and deciding how to communicate information. The book argues that values can influence science in these ways without harming scientific objectivity—in fact, making value judgments more explicit actually promotes objectivity. In place of the value-free ideal, the scientific community should strive to meet three conditions for addressing values appropriately: (1) the influences of values should be made transparent; (2) values should reflect ethical and social priorities; and (3) values should be scrutinized via processes of engagement that incorporate multiple stakeholders. The book explores multiple engagement strategies that can help bring values to light and subject them to critical scrutiny.
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“Bias mostly occurs unintentionally (i.e., subconsciously); for example, when a scientist underpowers a study or is not aware of sexist assumptions that underpin their interpretive framework [48–52].”
From Autonomous artificial intelligence, scientific research, and human values (2026) · cites this paper as [50]
In the citing paper
“Most scientific research done by humans stems from personal, social, political, or economic values that drive inquiry [33, 50, 105].”
From Autonomous artificial intelligence, scientific research, and human values (2026) · cites this paper as [50]
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Porat, T., Nyrup, R., Calvo, R. A., Paudyal, P., & Ford, E. M. (2020) · Frontiers in Public Health · doi:10.3389/fpubh.2020.573397 · Cited by 194
Artificial intelligence and the value of transparency
Walmsley, J. (2021) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-020-01066-z · Cited by 131
Making Open Science Work for Science and Society
Elliott, K. C., & Resnik, D. B. (2019) · Environmental Health Perspectives · doi:10.1289/ehp4808 · Cited by 136
Self-citationDemocratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science
Schroeder, S. A. (2019) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axz023 · Cited by 106
Elliott, K. C. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009052597 · Cited by 99
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Elliott, K. C.
- Corresponding author
- Elliott, Kevin C.
- ORCID
- Elliott, Kevin C.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2017-02-03
- OpenAlex
- W2577177528
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 64 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 47 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 26.51
- Type
- book
- Language
- fi
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- values in science, value-free ideal, scientific objectivity, stakeholder engagement, science and ethics, climate science, chemical risk assessment, biomedical research, science communication, scientific uncertainty
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