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From Madhyamaka to Consequentialism
Abstract
This chapter addresses the question of whether emptiness is compatible with ethics. It draws upon a particular philosophical reconstruction of the Madhyamaka by the great Tibetan philosopher Tsong kha pa and then formulates the Madhyamaka view as the claim that there is no such thing as self or intrinsic nature anywhere. It argues that a Madhyamaka understanding of the emptiness of the person can be used to block one of the most popular objections against universalist consequentialism, and provide a non-justifying psychological explanation for some of the emotional resistance to such views. A proper Madhyamaka view of the relationship between well-being and social norms can also be hospitable to consequentialism.
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“Goodman's 2015 defense of consequentialism and his corresponding reading of Śāntideva's arguments rests more substantially on conventional distinctions between persons, though this reading still seems to favor the other two points I enumerated above (the deconstruction of identity and the ethically grounding role of this deconstruction).”
From Buddhism as Reductionism: Personal Identity and Ethics in Parfitian Readings of Buddhist Philosophy; from Steven Collins to the Present (2018) · cites this paper as Goodman 2015
Citations
Cited by
Hanner, O. (2018) · Sophia · doi:10.1007/s11841-018-0668-3 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Goodman, C.
- Corresponding author
- Goodman, Charles
- ORCID
- Goodman, Charles
- Venue
- Moonpaths
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2015-12-01
- Pages
- 141-158
- OpenAlex
- W2505205592
- Cited by
- 13
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 10 · 2022: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 19.51
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Religious studies › Indian and Buddhist Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Keywords
- emptiness, Madhyamaka, Tsongkhapa, consequentialism, ethics, self, well-being, social norms, Tibetan philosophy
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
