Exploring Inductive Risk
Abstract
The introductory chapter provides an overview of the book Exploring Inductive Risk . It introduces the concept of inductive risk, briefly traces the history of the argument from inductive risk, and sets out the book’s chapters in terms of four themes. The first part, “Weighing Inductive Risk,” illustrates the concept of inductive risk and the judgments involved in weighing different sorts of errors. The chapters in the second part, “Evading Inductive Risk,” examine proposals by critics who argue that the value judgments associated with inductive risk should be made by citizens and policymakers, not by scientists. The third section, “The Breadth of Inductive Risk,” illustrates the wide variety of decision points throughout scientific practice where considerations of inductive risk are relevant. The book’s fourth section, “Exploring the Limits of Inductive Risk,” considers whether it still makes sense to apply the label of inductive risk to such a broad array of phenomena.
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Whether current chatbots are conscious is ultimately an empirical question, and empirical testing is probabilistic, involving inductive risk, i.e., the possibility of false positives or false negatives given the available evidence.
“whether current chatbots are conscious is ultimately an empirical question, and empirical testing is probabilistic, involving”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Elliot & Richards, 2017
Value judgments are required to set evidential thresholds, and if the agent is transparent about their judgment, consistently applies their threshold as new data emerges, and stays open to revising their stance, the resulting value-laden belief is unproblematic.
“Many philosophers of science hold that these value judgments are required to set evidential thresholds and if the agent is transparent about their judgment, consistently applies their threshold as new data emerges, and stays open to revising their stance, the resulting value-laden belief is unproblematic (e.g., Longino, 2002;Elliot & Richards, 2017).”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Elliot & Richards, 2017
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Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent?
Peters, U. (2026) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-026-09795-8
- Authors
- Elliott, K. C., & Richards, T.
- Venue
- Oxford Scholarship Online
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2017-06-22
- OpenAlex
- W4241031802
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 2.06
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- inductive risk, value judgments in science, weighing error, scientific decision-making
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