The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology
Abstract
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.
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Cites
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 1×
“Someone could even take us to be material things larger than our bodies (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundParfit, D. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001 · Cited by 5,045
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
CARR, H. W. (1923) · Nature · doi:10.1038/111246a0 · Cited by 2,608
An Essay concerning Human Understanding
(1924) · Nature · doi:10.1038/114462c0 · Cited by 2,269
Strawson, P. F. (2002) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203221303 · Cited by 2,127
Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time
Sider, T. (2001) · doi:10.1093/019924443x.001.0001 · Cited by 1,907
N., E., & Ayer, A. J. (1936) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2016260 · Cited by 1,169
The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life
McMahan, J. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0195079981.001.0001 · Cited by 1,157
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic
Lewis, D. K., & The Journal of Philosophy, I. (1968) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024555 · Cited by 1,078
Talmor, E. (1986) · History of European Ideas · doi:10.1016/0191-6599(86)90019-7 · Cited by 1,061
Metadata
- Authors
- Olson, E. T.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2007-09-01
- OpenAlex
- W2189409868
- Cited by
- 281
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 4.18
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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