Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality
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Abstract
This book develops and defends dispositionalism about modality: the view that metaphysical modality is a matter of the dispositions that objects have. Dispositionalism is an attractive view for actualists about modality, and for anyone who embraces an anti-Humean metaphysics of powers. This book shows in detail how such a view is to be formulated, which challenges it faces, and how they may be met. The book begins by arguing that a realist account of dispositions is committed to more than just the ordinary dispositions that are typically appealed to: fragility, solubility, irascibility, and so forth. Rather, realists must embrace a more general notion, which is labelled ‘potentiality’. With that more general notion, a straightforward definition of metaphysical possibility can be given: it is possible that p if and only if something has (or had, or will have) an iterated potentiality for p (that is, a potentiality to be such that p, or a potentiality to be such that something has a potentiality to be such that p, or …). The metaphysics of potentiality is examined in detail to show that the view meets the three main challenges for a metaphysics of modality: (1) Extensional correctness: providing the right truth-values for statements of possibility and necessity; (2) formal adequacy: providing the right logic for metaphysical modality; and (3) semantic utility: providing a semantics that links ordinary modal language to the metaphysics of modality.
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Cited by
Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature
Chen, E. K., & Goldstein, S. (2022) · Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-96775-8_2 · Cited by 69
“MinP is not committed to a fundamental direction of time; nor is it committed to 25In a recent book, Vetter (2015) is open to the idea that there can be past-directed dispositions but still suggests that there is a temporal asymmetry: past-directed dispositions are trivial. dynamic production as…”
BackgroundShoring up divine simplicity against modal collapse: a powers account
LENOW, J. E. (2021) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412518000859 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Vetter, B.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2015-02-12
- OpenAlex
- W4244632712
- Cited by
- 374
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.25
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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