The Motivational Theory of Emotions
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Abstract
Having an emotion customarily involves appraising a stimulus a particular way, feeling a particular way, and being motivated to act a particular way. These three aspects offer distinctive entry points for explaining what emotions are. Philosophers have so far built their accounts primarily around appraisals and feelings. As a result, two research programs have dominated the philosophy of emotions over the past forty years: Cognitivism and Perceptualism. The objective of this paper is to introduce a new Motivational Theory of Emotions, which replaces the primacy of the appraisal and feeling aspects of emotions with the primacy of their motivational dimension. The core proposal is that emotions are action control systems designed to prioritize the pursuit of some goals over others. The Motivational Theory will be shown to explain how emotions motivate better than Cognitivism and Perceptualism, and to offer solutions to two outstanding problems in the philosophy of emotions: explaining the intentionality of emotions and explaining how emotions differ from one another.
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Citations
Cited by
Consciousness and Moral Status
Shepherd, J. (2018) · doi:10.4324/9781315396347 · Cited by 161
Investigating Emotions as Functional States Distinct From Feelings
Adolphs, R., & Andler, D. (2018) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073918765662 · Cited by 126
Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account
Fernandez Velasco, P., & Loev, S. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4 · Cited by 43
“This evaluative dimension, in turn, is closely associated with another important feature of affective experiences: they are motivational, in that they exert a motivational push and directly motivate behaviour and action (Corns 2014; Scarantino 2014; Carruthers 2017; Kozuch 2018).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Scarantino, A.
- Venue
- Moral Psychology and Human Agency
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2014-11-06
- Pages
- 156-185
- OpenAlex
- W2492411377
- Cited by
- 273
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.77
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Motivational Theory of Emotions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717812.003.0008
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- Scarantino, A. (2014). The Motivational Theory of Emotions. Moral Psychology and Human Agency. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198717812.003.0008
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