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Resolving the paradoxes

Potter, Michael · 2008 · Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Abstract

The discussion of Wittgenstein's account of quantification in Chapter 20 left unaddressed what sort of theory of types it commits us to. To answer this question we need to look in more detail at the motivation for believing in logical types at all. That motivation derives from Russell's paradox, the problem which had originally attracted Wittgenstein's notice back in 1909. This chapter discusses Russell's theory of types, Wittgenstein's vicious circle principle, types as classes of propositions, types and molecular propositions, types and generality, uniting generality and truth-functions, the general form of proposition, and unsayability.

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Metadata

Authors
Potter, M.
Venue
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic
Published
2008-10-01
Pages
184-195
OpenAlex
W2494206234
Cited by
224
References
0
FWCI
350.35
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Resolving the paradoxes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.003.0021
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Potter, M. (2008). Resolving the paradoxes. Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199215836.003.0021

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.