Compositional christology without Nestorianism

Abstract

In the recent literature a number of philosophers have argued in favour of a compositional christology, that is, an understanding of the incarnation that allows for Christ to be composed of a human nature which is a concrete particular, a body—soul composite, plus the Second Person of the Trinity. There are two important objections to this sort of reasoning. The first is that the Word cannot be identical with his human nature if his human nature is a material object (or part of his human nature is a material object). For this would seem to mean God has a material part. It would also mean God is composite. A second objection turns on how this conception of the metaphysics of the incarnation can avoid Nestorianism, the heresy according to which Christ is composed of two persons, one human, the other divine. This chapter offers an argument that rebuts these objections, in defence of compositional christology.