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Liberalism without Perfection
Abstract
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition
Rawls, J. (1971) · Cited by 1,504
Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism
CHAN, J. (2000) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.00005.x · Cited by 237
Cited by
Democracy without Shortcuts: A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy
Lafont, C. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198848189.001.0001 · Cited by 257
Justice and Egalitarian Relations
Schemmel, C. (2021) · Justice and Egalitarian Relations · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0001 · Cited by 48
Taking rulers' interests seriously: The case for realist theories of legitimacy
Cross, B. (2024) · European Journal of Political Theory · doi:10.1177/14748851221114302 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Quong, J.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2010-12-01
- OpenAlex
- W107842537
- Cited by
- 1,422
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 22.91
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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